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Risk Invulnerability: The Impact of A  
Desirable Background Risk 
by 
HUI Sai Kit 
Master of Philosophy  
I extend the classical risk vulnerability definition proposed by 
Gollier and Pratt (1996) and suggest a new definition namely risk 
invulnerability, which is to say a desirable background risk that 
has a positive mean value exceeding the precautionary saving 
premium makes a decision maker less risk averse with respect to 
other independent risk. While the value function used in Milne and 
Robertson (1996) is comparable to the von Neumann Morgenstern 
utility function used in risk invulnerability, I follow the literature 
and show that a corporate under stochastic wealth and threat of 
liquidation is risk invulnerable when the wealth level of this 
company does not meet the dividend payment threshold. In light 
of this general case, I propose a specific application of an 
insurance company suggested by Rochet and Villeneuve (2011), 
which is facing a zero-or-full reinsurance strategy because of a 
huge risk. I first confirm that a non-dividend paying insurance 
company is risk invulnerable, and then investigate the effect of 
reinsurance on risk invulnerability. I propose that, when the 
insurance company switch its reinsurance strategy from zero to 
full coverage, there is an instant decrease in the level of risk 
invulnerability reflected by the change of magnitude of the 
corresponding conditions.  
Key words: Risk invulnerability, desirable risk, increasing 
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As an investor, he may faces some background risks other than the investment
risks generated by holding risky assets, such as labor income (i.e. future income
uncertainty), housing risks (i.e. fluctuation of housing market or rent) etc..
Classical studies on background risk suggest that its existence increases an in-
dividual’s risk aversion towards other independent risks. While this may not
be the absolute case, Gollier and Pratt (1996) propose the concept of risk vul-
nerability and investigate that, under which conditions, an unfair background
risk guarantees that a decision maker (DM) behaves in a more risk averse way.
Classic papers by Gollier and Pratt (1996), Eeckhoudt et al. (1996), Franke
et al. (2006), and others explore conditions for risk vulnerability, as well as
its implications. In contrast to this result, I examine the effect of a desirable
background risk on the attitude of a DM to bear other independent risks.
I first extend the classical risk vulnerability concept proposed by Gollier
and Pratt (1996) by showing that a DM can still be risk vulnerable under
desirable background risks. Then I introduce a concept of risk invulnerability,
namely that, imposing a desirable background risk under certain condition
reduces the DM’s risk aversion.
While most of the existing literature about risk preferences are mainly
at individual level, I bring the analysis to a corporate level and examine the
corporate risk preferences determined by managerial decision makers. Con-
ventionally understanding the firm behaviors depends on the decision makers’
(managers) preference. However, there is no agency problem in our corporate
setting same as Milne and Robertson (1996), meaning that managers make
decisions at the best to the shareholders. The primary objective of managers
are to maximize the shareholders’ value, or equivalently firm value function,
which is actually the present value of the shareholders’ expected utility of the
managerial decisions. Therefore, managerial risk preference can be ignored
and only shareholders’ should be focused on. Given by this stand point, I
question whether some individual risk behaviors or preferences can be applied
on companies since they are founded and controlled by a group of individuals.
In order to answer this question, the function that can represent every single
shareholder should be used, which is the firm value function. Besides, accord-
ing to Sitkin and Pablo (1992), the factors that alter firm’s risk behaviors and
preferences include characteristics of the company. It is difficult to conclude
the results or control the related firm characteristics if I simply apply the tra-
ditional individual theory to each shareholders of the company.
Furthermore, since multiple existing literature conduct analysis by assum-
ing shareholders are risk neutral (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Wright et al.,
2002; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007), or equivalently the firms have linear risk
preference (Nelson, 1961; Tisdell, 1963, Dreze and Gabszewicz, 1967; Mills
1961), I incorporate some firm level background risk (e.g. human capital risk,
operational risk etc.) and other independent threats to investigate the risk
behaviors and preferences of risk averse shareholders (firms). To be specific, I
would like to examine the risk vulnerability and invulnerability theory to firms
with both background risk and other independent threats and see whether the
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theories are applicable.
With the above inspiration, I then apply my result obtained at individual
analysis to a continuous time framework in which a firm has a wealth follow-
ing stochastic process and faces a threat of liquidation as it is not allowed
to perform external financing. Given that the shareholders and the firm are
risk averse and prudent to the threat of liquidation, I further identify that
my proposed conditions for risk invulnerability hold when background risk is
small and so that the firm is risk invulnerable to the threat. This corporate
level application thus creates useful implications to explain multiple corporate
behaviors. I also provide a specific application of my theory on an insurance
company setting suggested by Rochet and Villeneuve (2011). Such kind of
firms are then shown to be risk invulnerable and investigated how this nature
changes in accordance with the reinsurance strategy.
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I briefly introduce the
developments of the existing literature. In Chapter 3, I propose the definition
of risk invulnerability and provide a sufficient condition for it. Then, a cor-
porate level application will be included in Chapter 4. I conclude the whole
thesis in the last chapter.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Developments of Risk Aversion and Prudence
Since the coefficient of risk aversion has first been approximated by Pratt
(1964), it has been extended to different theories and applied in different fields.
Pratt (1964) suggest that the level of absolute risk aversion can be ap-
proximated by a risk premium, the amount that a decision maker is willing
to pay to reduce the risk to its expectation. The coefficient measures how the
concavity of a von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function changes.
Then a similar technique has been adopted if the risk happened in the
future, like Kimball (1990) who develops a concept of prudence. It is referred
by the precautionary saving motive induced by the future risk. The level of
prudence is then approximated by the precautionary premium, which is simi-
lar to the concept of risk premium.
Pratt and Zeckhauser (1987) make reference with the development of de-
creasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) which demonstrates that the level of
risk aversion, measured by risk premium, decreasing with respect to wealth
and propose a similar behavior called proper risk aversion. This suggests that
a decreasing risk averse DM will never find a undesirable lotteries desirable
due to an introduction of other undesirable lotteries.
Similarly, Kimball (1993) utilizes these concepts and identified a behavior
called standard risk aversion, which incorporated both DARA and decreasing
absolute prudence (DAP). The concept utilizes the measurement of prudence
suggested by Kimball (1990). DAP can then be interpreted as a decreasing
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relationship between precautionary saving motive or precautionary premium
and wealth. Standard risk aversion refers to a certain type of decision maker
who did not prefer ”all or nothing”, which means he prefers to separate two
risks and put them in different states rather than bearing both in the same
state. Standard risk aversion is a weaker concept because, while the proper
risk aversion requires two undesirable risks, standard risk aversion only re-
quires one undesirable risk and one loss-aggravating risk.
Gollier and Pratt (1996) introduce a concept called risk vulnerability. It
is defined as a DM will be more risk averse to other independent risk due to
an introduction of an unfair background risk. Decreasing and concave abso-
lute risk aversion is the necessary and sufficient conditions of risk vulnerability.
Gollier and Pratt (1996) also demonstrate that risk vulnerability is the weakest
concept of the above by proving that all proper and standard utility function
have to be risk vulnerable.
2.2 Developments of Corporate Liquidity Management
Among the first to utilize liquidity management models in corporate level anal-
ysis, such as Jeanblanc-Picque and Shiryaev (1995), Radner and Shepp (1996)
and Milne and Robertson (1996) etc., general type of corporations are used in
the literature.
Radner and Shepp (1996) try to identify the optimal strategy of the pro-
duction technology to maximize the firm value and, also, identify that, since
the company will choose a greater volatility/drift ratio once the wealth holding
increases, they propose that every company is going to liquid in a finite time
period.
Milne and Robertson (1996) examine a case where the company has to
determine the optimal dividend strategy to maximize the company’s value.
They identify that a corporate facing a threat of liquidation and having insuf-
ficient wealth to meet the threshold of paying dividends has the nature of risk
aversion and DARA.
One stream of the existing literature intend to smooth or add some bound-
aries to produce interesting results. For example, normally, in order to create a
framework that management liquid reserve is necessary to the company, some
boundaries such as no external financing, liquidation when company’s wealth
drops to zero etc., are imposed. Specifically,
Radner and Shepp (1996) smooth the single production technology prob-
lem in Jeanblanc-Picque and Shiryaev (1995) by creating a multi-technology
framework and Jiang and Pistorius (2012) impose a ”regime switches” which
allows company not to be bounded by one regime only and shows how the
dividend paying threshold changes in accordance with the regime adopted by
the company.
Paulsen and Gjessing (1997) smooth the setting of ”save to survive” and
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allow investment by using the retained earnings. Also, instead of incorporat-
ing Brownian risk, they also allow a compound Poisson process to be one of
the random driver of the company’s net earnings.
Furthermore, while Stokey (2009) allows equity issuance and add a finan-
cial friction which is a fixed issuance cost to the model, Scheer and Schmidli
(2011) follow a similar framework but incorporate a jump in the stock price
dynamic model; Lokka and Zervos (2008) smooth the assumption of fixed is-
suance cost and propose proportional issuance cost. Literature which smooths
certain conditions is intended to polish the models in a more realistic way.
Besides the general application, several literature have brought the models
to different industries like insurance industry. Traditionally, liquidity manage-
ment model in insurance company are used in minimizing the probability of
ruin, which means the possibility of liquidation due to poor underwriting and
high risk exposure of the company.
After De Finetti (1957), saying that the insurance company should have an
alternative objective which is firm value maximization, the Cramer-Lundberg
model has been well suggested to model an insurance company which is facing
the dividend distribution problem under not only a Brownian risk but also a
huge loss following a process of compound Poisson process.
Hoejgaard and Taksar (1998) suggest that the insurance firm facing the
Brownian risk only have a possibility to seek reinsurance. The firm has to
decide the optimal reinsurance strategy to control the risk exposure and max-
imize the firm value. The study aims at identifying what is the optimal pro-
portional reinsurance coverage and how this proportion affects the dividend
distribution threshold.
Furthermore, Rochet and Villeneuve (2011) combine the Cramer-Lundberg
model and Hoejgaard and Taksar (1998) and impose an optimization problem
of the insurance firm under both two types of risks.
Eisenberg and Schmidli (2011) adopt a similar framework but, instead of
identifying an optimal reinsurance strategy to maximize firm value, they focus
on minimizing the probability of ruin.
2.3 Contributions of the Thesis
My thesis provides new conditions to the traditional risk vulnerability theory,
proposes the sufficient conditions for the alternative theory, namely risk invul-
nerability, and examines this theory in two separate corporate cases.
Firstly, tradition economic theories (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1987; Kimball
, 1993; Gollier and Pratt 1996) mainly focus on analyzing behavior under un-
desirable risks. They seldom study desirable risks. I show the intuition that
any desirable background risks will decrease the DM’s intensity of risk aver-
sion towards other independent risk is not flawless. Instead, I demonstrate
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several conditions that prove a desirable background risk which have an ex-
pected value lower than the precautionary premium can still put the DM in
a vulnerable position. In other words, my study releases the condition of risk
vulnerability.
Secondly, I suggest an under-explored combination of condition which
decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and increasing absolute prudence
(IAP) to be the sufficient conditions of risk invulnerability.
Thirdly, I use firm value function to represent the expected utility of a
group of shareholders reacting to the managerial decisions as a whole and
conclude that individual risk behaviors and preferences due to a background
risk and other independent threats are applicable in firm level. I incorporate
a general corporate case suggested by Milne and Robertson (1996) and a spe-
cific insurance company case proposed by Rochet and Villeneuve (2011), which
may lead to a series of investigations on applying the findings from individual
behavioral theories on firms, or lead the analysis to identify different firm level
risk taking behaviors corresponding to the preferences.
Unlike Gollier and Pratt (1996) which examine risk vulnerability only, my
study propose the determinants of the intensity of risk invulnerability and
identify that switching from full-coverage to zero-coverage reinsurance strat-
egy instantly decreases the intensity of risk invulnerability by showing greater
DARA and IAP.
3 Model
3.1 Characterizations of Risk Vulnerability and Invulnerabil-
ity
Consider a DM whose preference for wealth w can be represented by an ex-
pected utility. I let u(.) denote the utility function. In this thesis, I assume
any utility function u(w) in the following is u′ > 0, u′′ ≤ 0 and u′′′ ≥ 0. x̃
is a background risk. Kimball (1990) proposes the following measurement of
precautionary saving premium.
Definition 3.1. (Kimball 1990) The precautionary saving premium ψ(x̃, w)
is defined by
Eu′(w + x̃) = u′(w + Ex̃− ψ). (1)
The precautionary saving premium directly measures the money that the DM
is willing to pay to remove the effect of the risk on the marginal utility function.
Gollier and Pratt (1996) propose the following definition:
Definition 3.2. (Gollier and Pratt 1996) Preference function u displays “risk
vulnerability” if the presence of an exogenous background risk with a nonposi-
tive mean, namely, an unfair risk, raises the aversion to any other independent
risks, or equivalently,
Ex̃ ≤ 0⇒ −Eu
′′(w + x̃)
Eu′(w + x̃)
≥ R(w) ∀w. (2)
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where R(.) = −u
′′(.)
u′(,) is the absolute risk aversion coefficient. Risk vulnera-
bility means that the DM is more risk averse when she is exposed to such a
background risk than when she is not.
I propose the following definition to extend the classic concept of risk
vulnerability.
Definition 3.3. Preference function u can exhibit “risk vulnerability” in the
presence of an exogenous background risk if it increases the aversion to any
other independent risks.
The above definition does not require the background risk has a non-positive
mean value. In light of this definition, I propose the following sufficient con-
dition.
Proposition 3.4. The presence of a background risk increases the aversion




3. Ex̃ ≤ ψ ∀w.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The above proposition provides evidence that a desirable risk can still make
a DM becomes more risk averse, which says that she is still vulnerable to other
independent risks because the background project does not yield an expected
value high enough.
Now I examine the impact of a background risk that has a high enough
in expected value. The intuition suggests that such a background risk must
decrease the aversion to other independent risks. It should induce the DM to
buy less insurance, and to increase her demand for a risky asset. To investigate
this intuition, I propose the following definition:
Definition 3.5. Preference function u exhibit “risk invulnerability” if the
presence of an exogenous positive mean value background risk reduces the aver-
sion to any other independent risks.
Then, I provide a sufficient condition for risk invulnerability in the follow-
ing proposition.
Proposition 3.6. The presence of a risk reduces the aversion to other risk;




3. Ex̃ ≥ ψ ∀w.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Proposition 3.6 shows that, in order to guarantee that the introduction
of a background risk reduces the aversion to other independent risks, I need
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not only DARA and IAP, but also a sufficiently high mean value of the back-
ground risk. A DM is risk invulnerable to any other risks if he has DARA
and IAP in nature and the background project earns high enough to fulfil his
precautionary saving premium.
3.2 Intensity of Risk Invulnerability
From proposition 3.6, by fulfilling the three conditions, the DM who is facing
a desirable background risk high enough to cover the precautionary saving
premium will be less risk averse to other independent risk. I hereby question
how the intensity of risk invulnerability, measured by the level of risk aversion
reduced by the introduction of a desirable background risk, is affected in re-
sponse to the changes of the conditions.
















′′(w) + x̃u′′′(w) + 0.5x̃2u(4)(w)]




1− Ex̃P (w) + 0.5Ex̃2P (w)T (w)
1− Ex̃R(w) + 0.5Ex̃2P (w)R(w)
− 1
=
Ex̃[R(w)− P (w)] + 0.5Ex̃2[P (w)T (w)− P (w)R(w)]
1−R(w)[Ex̃− 0.5Ex̃2P (w)]
=
[Ex̃− 0.5Ex̃2P (w)][R(w)− P (w)] + 0.5Ex̃2P (w)[T (w)− P (w)]
1−R(w)[Ex̃− 0.5Ex̃2P (w)]
where P (w) = −u
′′′(w)
u′′(w) is the level of prudence; T (w) = −
u(4)(w)
u′′′(w) is the level
of temperance. If the risk x̃ is infinitesimally small and positive, <(w)−R(w)R(w)
should be less than zero if DARA (P (w) ≥ R(w)) and IAP (P (w) ≥ T (w))
holds. This calculation not only confirms the conditions included in proposi-
tion 3.6, but also shows that the level of risk aversion reduced by the presence
of desirable background risk, or equivalently the intensity of risk invulnerabil-
ity, is dependent on how much the conditions change.
In here, R(w) − P (w) and T (w) − P (w) are only one of the methods to
measure how much the level of risk aversion and prudence change. In Chapter
4 I will use the first derivative of the risk aversion’s and prudence’s coefficient
to measure directly the change of these two attitudes.
3.3 Measuring Small Desirable Risk
Now consider a situation where the size of the desirable background risk is
infinitesimally small. I provide the following proposition:
Lemma 3.7. Ex̃ ≥ ψ holds when the positive mean value background risk is
infinitesimally small.
Proof. See Appendix C.
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The purpose of discussing this small-risk situation is that, as soon as this
proposition holds, I can examine the risk invulnerability in continuous frame-
work. If a company instead of an individual is facing infinite small background
risks, the wealth should follows the stochastic process. Also, since I show that
Ex̃ ≥ ψ holds, I only have to identify the nature of risk aversion and prudence
of a company. This proof becomes a bridge between individual discrete anal-
ysis and company analysis.
4 Corporate Risk Invulnerability
4.1 Corporations under Brownian Risk
In this part, I consider here an example applying Proposition 3.6 and Lemma
3.7. In particular, since Ex̃ ≥ ψ holds when x̃ is small, I would like to demon-
strate that DARA and IAP are naturally implied by the firms mentioned
below.
Milne and Robertson (1996) consider that the movement of a corporation’s
wealth follows a stochastic process mt and the corporation has to decide when
to pay dividends lt to maximize corporation value under the threat of liqui-
dation, because the firm can not perform external financing. It can only save
money to escape from liquidation. In this case, the firm is exposed to both
background risk from the stochastic process of wealth and other independent
risk from the threat of liquidation. The movement of mt is defined as follow:
dmt = (rmt + µ− lt)dt+ σdZ, m0 = w, (3)
where r is the reward of saving; µ is the drift term; σ is the volatility and Z
is a Brownian motion.
The value of the shareholders and the corporation, denoted as V , is an ex-
pected utility of the discounted stream of future optimal dividends determined
by the managers.
V (w) = E[
∫ ∞
0
e−ρτu(lτ )dτ |m0 = w], (4)
where ρ > r is the shareholders’ discount rate. Using the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation, Milne and Robertson (1996) determine the optimal control
flow (the dividend flow) in different the states (cash reserves) to achieve the










Then they impose some boundary conditions to this value function to
identify some of the characteristics. For example, The conditions are (1) cor-
poration will liquidate if V = 0; (2) V ′ = 1 and V ′′ = 0 at m∗, where m∗
is the dividend payment threshold for wealth; (3) for mt ≥ m∗, V (mt) =
V (m∗) + mt −m∗ and (4) V ′ ≥ 1, V ′′ ≤ 0 and V ′′′ > 0 within 0 < m < m∗.
Notice that the value function of the company mentioned is not only represent-
ing a groups of shareholders’ expected utility function, but also incorporate
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some firm specific characteristics and boundaries, which helps us to obtain a
thorough understanding on firm’s risk preferences. If saving is not rewarded
(i.e. r = 0) and there is no dividend payout, the company will only save money
and has the following equation:
1
2
σ2V ′′ + µV ′ − ρV = 0, 0 < m < m∗, (6)
and a co-state equation
1
2
σ2V ′′′ + µV ′′ − (ρ− r)V ′ = 0. (7)
Based on these two equations, I propose that
Proposition 4.1. Over the non-dividend paying region 0 < m < m∗, a cor-
poration under Brownian risk and threat of liquidation has DARA and IAP,
and therefore is risk invulnerable.
Proof. See Appendix D.
The corporation is concluded to be risk invulnerable given by its stochastic
process, DARA, IAP in nature, meaning that the shareholders’ and the com-
panies’ willingness to bear other risks is invulnerable due to the introduction
of a desirable background risk only when its expected value exceeds the pre-
cautionary saving premium. Here the corporation’s risk invulnerability is en-
dogenous and stems from the financial frictions: even though shareholders are
risk neutral or fully diversified, the corporation behaves in a risk-invulnerable
way because a desirable background risk may reduce the threat of liquidation.
4.2 Insurance Company under Huge Loss and Reinsurance
With reference to the above findings, I extend the previous application to an
insurance company facing, Brownian risk, huge loss and reinsurance opportu-
nity. I demonstrate that the conditions of risk invulnerability still hold in this
specific application. In Rochet and Villeneuve (2011), an insurance company
has the following dynamics of liquid reserves under a background risk, inde-
pendent huge loss and reinsurance opportunity:
dMπt = (µ− itlλ)dt+ σdZt − dLt − (1− it)ldNt (8)
where µ > itlλ and there is no external financing; i = {it ∈ [0, 1], t ≥ 0} is pro-
portional reinsurance process, measuring the fraction of l which is re-insured; l
is a large devastating loss which makes V (m− l) = V (0) = 0; N = {Nt, t ≥ 0}
is a Poisson process with intensity λ; the probability that a huge loss happens
over an interval [t, t+ dt] is λdt; L is a cumulative dividend process.
Same as the last application, the insurance company is exposed to liqui-
dation threat so that it has to determine its optimal dividend payment and
proportion of reinsurance. show that the dividend threshold, denoted as m∗1,
exists in which V ′ = 1 and V ′′ = 0. Within [0,m∗1], while there is no dividend
payment, the HJB equation becomes
(ρ+ λ)V (m) =
σ2
2
V ′′(m) + max
i∈[0,1]
{(µ− itlλ)V ′(m) + λV (m− (1− i)l)}. (9)
9




{(µ− itlλ)V ′(m) + λV (m− (1− i)l)} (10)
with respect to i yields
λl[V ′(m− (1− i)l)− V ′(m)] = 0. (11)
Given that V ′(m) is decreasing, the only solution for m − (1 − i)l = m is
i = 1. It means that there is a corner solution at a threshold m∗0 in which
the insurance company will switch from zero to full reinsurance. While it is
obvious that condition (11) is larger than zero if i = 0, the optimal reinsurance
strategy is
i∗ = 0 if m ≤ m∗0
= 1 if m ∈ [m∗0,m∗1]
In the full reinsurance situation, on m ∈ [m∗0,m∗1] where i∗ = 1, the state
equation and co-state equation become
σ2
2




V ′′′(m) + (µ− lλ)V ′′(m)− (ρ− r)V ′(m) = 0, (13)
where µ′(m) = r. With regards to these two equations, I propose that:
Proposition 4.2. Under the zero-exposure region, the insurance company is
risk invulnerable.
Proof. See Appendix E.
I observe that, under full reinsurance coverage, the insurance company has
the same level of DARA and IAP as the company mentioned by Milne and
Robertson (1996). Since the huge loss is fully reinsured, the insurance com-
pany has to bear the Brownian risk like a general corporate, and therefore,
they are similarly risk invulnerable.
In contrast, on the region m ≤ m∗0 where i∗ = 0, I first propose that
an insurance company facing huge risk is risk invulnerable even there is zero
reinsurance. When there is no dividend payments, I have the state equation
σ2
2
V ′′(m) + µV ′(m)− (ρ+ λ)V (m) = 0, (14)
as V (m− l) = 0, and the co-state equation
σ2
2
V ′′′(m) + µV ′′(m)− (ρ+ λ− r)V ′(m) = 0. (15)
With regards to these two equations, I propose that:
Proposition 4.3. An insurance company which is entirely not covered by the
reinsurance has greater intensity of risk invulnerability.
10
Proof. See Appendix F.
If I compare the results obtained from full and zero reinsurance coverage









) and IAP (by 2λ
σ2
[ (V ′′)2−V ′V ′′′
(V ′′)2
]
). Given that the insurance
is fully exposed to the huge loss, according to the intensity of risk invulner-
ability, greater DARA and IAP means the DM would be more risk averse in
the presence of desirable background risk. Equivalently, the DM has greater
intensity of risk invulnerability.
5 Implications of Risk Invulnerability
Under the setting with no agency problem, risk preference like DARA and
IAP reflected by firm value function represents the risk preference of a group
of shareholders. Individual theories like risk vulnerability and invulnerability
are applicable in firm level due to desirable background risk and other inde-
pendent threats.
In terms of corporate investment, overestimating the demand on risky as-
sets when constructing the optimal portfolio may happens easily if background
risk is not considered (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Weil, 1992). Risk invulner-
ability ensures that introducing a simple desirable risk may not be helpful
enough to the company to conclude its optimal investment on risky asset. In
the case where a desirable risk earns high enough in expectation to cover the
company’s precautionary saving motive, optimal risky investment should be
increased. In particular, risk invulnerability ensures that, if a company has
this first order condition on an independent risk Eỹu′(w + α∗ỹ) = 0, DARA
and IAP are sufficient to conclude α∗Eỹu′(w+ z+α∗ỹ) ≥ 0 if the background
risk has z = Ex̃ ≥ ψ > 0.
It is common to interpret that a decreasingly risk averse firm will raise
its holding of risk assets if wealth increases. In addition to the change of
risk premium which shows how risk aversion drops in response to the increase
of wealth, IAP here may serve as another benchmark signalling the company
when to be less risk averse. While the company is getting wealthier but riskier,
it is preventive and conservative to create an buffer of saving increasing along-
side the wealth and riskiness.
6 Conclusion and Potential Developments
In this thesis, I extended the classical risk vulnerability concept by considering
a desirable background risk. A DM can still be risk vulnerable if there are
DARA, DAP and Ex̃ ≤ ψ. Then I introduced a concept of risk invulnera-
bility. It holds if a desirable background risk which has a positive expected
value exceeding the precautionary saving premium makes a DM becomes less
averse to other independent risks, i.e. for Ex̃ ≥ ψ ⇒ −Eu
′′(w+x̃)
Eu′(w+x̃) ≤ R(w) ∀w
in case where DARA and IAP hold. It can be interpreted as the background
project earns significant enough to cover the target saving amount or fulfill
11
the willingness to save.
Furthermore, I show that Ex̃ ≥ ψ holds when the size of the desirable
background risk is infinitesimally small and the level of risk aversion reduced
due to the presence of desirable background risk, namely intensity of risk invul-
nerability, is dependent to magnitudes of DARA and IAP. Since the corporate
value function is the discounted utility of a group of shareholders towards
managerial decisions, we apply risk invulnerability to corporate level analysis.
I first examined my theory by identifying that the nature of a corporation from
Milne and Robertson (1996) under a threat of liquidation and zero dividend
payments is DARA and IAP, which lead us to a conclusion that such corporate
is risk invulnerable.
In light of this general application, I expand the study by covering the in-
surance company under the settings from Rochet and Villeneuve (2011). This
insurance company is facing a huge loss with proportional reinsurance possi-
bility. I identify that, while the company’s huge loss is fully reinsured, the
company has the same level of DARA and IAP, or equivalently same inten-
sity of risk invulnerability, to the general corporate suggested by Milne and
Robertson (1996). If the insurance company is entirely exposed to the huge
loss, greater DARA and IAP have been identified, meaning that the insurance
company is acting more preventively and precautionarily.
As the implication of IAP together with and application in the corporate
level are under-explored, I expect that more corporate behaviors such as pref-
erences over financing and capital structure, or firms with different industrial
characteristics will be covered by risk invulnerability. Also, with regards to
the alternative strategy other than zero- or full-reinsurance policy adopted by
the insurance company, an unexplored area that this thesis can be extended
to is the insurance or reinsurance company which adopts different strategies of
insurance linked security. By determining some existing strategies (Niehous,
2002; Trottier, 2017) which is optimal to firm value maximization, I may in-
vestigate whether such kind of company is risk invulnerable.
12
Reference
De Finetti, B. (1957, February). Su un’impostazione alternativa della teoria
collettiva del rischio. In Transactions of the XVth international congress
of Actuaries (Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 433-443).
Dreze, J. H., Jaskold Gabszewicz, J. (1967). Demand fluctuations capacity
utilisation and prices (No. 7). Université catholique de Louvain, Center
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. Differentiating Eq (1) with respect to w and yield





= (1− ψ′)R(w + Ex̃− ψ). (17)




≥ R(w + Ex̃− ψ). (18)
Decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and Ex̃ ≤ ψ imply
R(w + Ex̃− ψ) ≥ R(w). (19)
Therefore I obtain −Eu
′′(w+x̃)
Eu′(w+x̃) ≥ R(w).
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3.6




≤ R(w + Ex̃− ψ). (20)
DARA and Ex̃ ≥ ψ imply
R(w + Ex̃− ψ) ≤ R(w). (21)
Therefore I obtain −Eu
′′(w+x̃)
Eu′(w+x̃) ≤ R(w).
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 3.7
Proof. Recall equation (1), it can be re-written as:
Eu′(w + kx̃) = u′(w + Ekx̃− ψ(k)) (22)
where k ∈ [0, 1] measures the size of the desirable background risk. By differ-
entiating the equation with k, I obtain:
Ex̃u′′(w + kx̃) = [Ex̃− ψ′(k)]u′′(w + Ekx̃− ψ(k)). (23)
When k → 0, ψ → 0. If k = 0, then equation (23) becomes
Ex̃u′′(w) = [Ex̃− ψ′(0)]u′′(w). (24)
Thus ψ′(0) = 0.
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Taking derivative with respect to k on both sides of Eq (23), I obtain:
E(x̃2)u′′′(w + kx̃) = Ex̃[Ex̃− ψ′(k)]u′′′(w + Ekx̃− ψ(k))−[
ψ′′(k)u′′(w + Ekx̃− ψ(k)) + ψ′(k)[Ex̃− ψ′(k)]u′′′(w + Ekx̃− ψ(k))
]
. (25)
When k = 0,
E(x̃2)u′′′(w) = (Ex̃)2u′′′(w)− ψ′′(0)u′′(w). (26)
With some simple rearrangements, I obtain
ψ′′(0) = σ2xP (w) (27)
where σ2x is the variance of the desirable background risk.
Applying Taylor expansion on ψ(k), I obtain
ψ(k) = kψ′(0) + k2ψ′′(0) + o(k2). (28)
Since ψ(0) and ψ′(0) equal to zero, combining equation (27) and (28), I have
Ekx̃− ψ(k) = Ekx̃− k2σ2xP (w) ≥ 0.
When k is infinitesimally small, k is significantly larger than k2. I can conclude
that Ekx̃ ≥ ψ(k) holds.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 4.1





and apply equation (7) to obtain that A′ < 0 (Milne and Robertson (1996),
Proposition 3). It illustrates that the corporation under the settings of Milne
and Robertson naturally imply decreasing absolute risk aversion.










(ρ− r)V ′/V ′′ − ρV/V ′
]
(30)
Based on the fourth conditions mentioned above (Milne and Robertson (1996),
Proposition 2), it is obvious that the result in equation (30) is negative. Define
P = −V ′′′V ′′ , I have
P = − 2
σ2
[
(ρ− r)V ′/V ′′ − µ
]
(31)
By differentiating P , I obtain











because DARA implies (V ′′)2−V ′V ′′′ ≤ 0. Under the normal assumption that
ρ > r, the slope of P is positive based on the settings of Milne and Robertson
(1996). Therefore, the first two conditions in Proposition 3.6 are satisfied.
17
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 4.2
Proof. The coefficient of risk aversion








































given that V ′ > 0, V ′′ < 0 and V ′′′ > 0. Then, by differentiating P with
respect to wealth, I obtain
P ′ = − 2
σ2
(ρ− r)







I conclude that the first two conditions in Proposition 3.6 are satisfied.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof. The coefficient of risk aversion
































− (ρ+ λ) V
V ′





given that V ′ > 0, V ′′ < 0 and V ′′′ > 0. Then, by differentiating P with
respect to wealth, I obtain
P ′ = − 2
σ2
(ρ+ λ− r)







I not only conclude first two conditions in Proposition 3.6 are satisfied, but
also confirm that reinsurance coverage has instant effect on the intensity of
risk invulnerability.
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